M. J. ELLIS

Field note 029

Justice, Apparently, Comes in Years

By M. J. Ellis

No campaign speech today. I'm interested in what we think we're doing when we punish somebody. The yard signs can stay outside.

I find it strange that we measure justice with a calendar.

Someone does something terrible, and we decide that the appropriate response is to take fifteen years of their life.

Not fifteen dollars. Not fifteen afternoons spent doing something useful.

Fifteen years.

Every breakfast. Every Tuesday. Every time a song comes on that reminds them of somebody. Fifteen years of being a person, except we've decided where they're going to do it and whether they're allowed to leave.

And we call this paying a debt to society.

I'm curious about the accounting.

Who receives the payment?

What makes fifteen years the amount owed?

Why not twelve? Why not eighteen?

That's six years of being alive sitting inside what sounds like a disagreement over the bill.


Some of it is straightforward enough.

If somebody is dangerous, keeping them away from the people they might hurt serves an obvious purpose.

I'm very much in favor of not being murdered. I've built quite a few plans around it.

But keeping someone confined because they're dangerous and keeping them confined because they deserve to suffer are different things.

Suppose we could somehow know that a person would never hurt anyone again.

Would we let them out?

If the answer is no, then preventing future harm isn't the whole explanation.

There's something else we want from the room.

Maybe we want the person to understand what they've done. Maybe we want them to become someone who wouldn't do it again. Maybe we want everyone else to look at the room and reconsider their plans for the weekend.

Or maybe we want them to hurt.

That last possibility is considerably less comfortable to say out loud.

It sounds much more respectable when the suffering has an approved duration.


I've also been thinking about who, exactly, we're punishing.

Imagine somebody commits a terrible act at twenty.

At forty, they're still imprisoned for it.

Are they the same person?

Legally, the continuity is easy enough to recognize. Same individual. Same history. We can't have people escaping responsibility every time they develop a new personality or discover woodworking.

But twenty years is a lot of being alive.

Think about yourself twenty years ago.

I can barely endorse some of the decisions I made last Thursday.

A person might spend those years regretting what they did, understanding it differently, becoming someone who would be horrified by the person who did it.

If changing them was part of the purpose, what do we do with the change?

At what point does it matter?

And if it never matters, why did we keep telling them to become someone else?

That seems like an important detail to leave out of the motivational speech.


There's another uncomfortable word sitting near all of this.

Revenge.

We generally understand the impulse. Someone hurts somebody you love, and a part of you wants them to experience something comparably unpleasant.

Possibly with interest.

Justice is supposed to involve more than that. Evidence. Restraint. Consistency. A judgment that isn't simply the loudest person's anger given access to equipment.

Those differences matter.

I don't want my fate determined by a group of furious people who all arrived already knowing what happened. That sounds like a comments section with the keys to my cell.

But a procedure can be fair and still leave us with a question about what the procedure is for.

We can establish who did something without settling what ought to happen to them.

And I wonder whether suffering becomes morally different when enough people agree to administer it.

A punishment might express something a society needs to say about an act and the person harmed by it.

But I don't think agreement itself does all the work.

People have agreed on some spectacularly terrible things.

We're very good at agreeing. It's what we're agreeing about that occasionally needs supervision.

And the supervisors are us, too.

That's the part that gets me.

There's no separate species of perfectly rational creature we bring in for the important decisions. It's people all the way up. People with childhoods, digestive systems, grudges, and opinions about how the dishwasher should be loaded.

Some of those people get to decide how much of another person's life will happen inside a room.

Everyone involved is going to die. Nobody has entirely worked out what being alive means.

But we can agree that this particular person should spend the next thirty years doing it over there.

Then everybody has to find their car.


Then there's the death penalty.

The room acquires an ending.

We've taken the most bewildering thing about being alive—the fact that it stops—and made it something we can schedule for somebody else.

Death is an enormous cosmic mystery until, apparently, it becomes an administrative decision.

I keep getting stuck on the difference between knowing what somebody did and knowing that we ought to kill them for it.

Those are two separate conclusions.

Even if there were no uncertainty about guilt, we'd still have to make the second one.

Does a sufficiently terrible act mean a person forfeits their right to remain alive?

If so, why?

Is death something they deserve? Something we need? A way to protect other people? A statement about the value of the life they took?

Those answers might arrive at the same sentence through very different doors.

And I don't think it helps to pretend the question is easy simply because the person we're discussing is difficult to feel compassion for.

Nobody has to become likable before we decide what we're allowed to do to them.

If rights depended entirely on whether other people liked you, I would want to have a fairly serious conversation with whoever has been reviewing my personality.

There's also the matter of being wrong.

Human beings making a decision together are still human beings. We don't become incapable of error because everyone has a designated seat.

Pile on enough charges, offer to drop most if I plead guilty, and suddenly “Did you do it?” becomes “How much of your life can you afford to bet?”

Killing someone places a fairly substantial limitation on what we can do with information that arrives later.

You can't release a dead person.

You can apologize to their family, investigate what happened, change the procedure.

The person at the center of all that improvement remains unavailable for comment.

And if death ends experience, there's something peculiar about calling it punishment. There's nobody left to experience it.

Perhaps that's the point. The punishment is the future they don't get to have.

Every possible future.

Some of those futures might have been terrible. Some might have involved remorse. Change. An attempt to do something worthwhile with whatever life remained.

We aren't only punishing an act that happened in the past.

We're deciding that there will be no more person after it.

That is an enormous amount of authority for creatures who occasionally discover they've been pushing a door clearly marked PULL.

The people they've harmed need protection. They need to be heard. They don't owe anybody forgiveness to make the rest of us feel more comfortable.


I don't have a tidy system to offer.

I suspect I'd become much less philosophically composed if somebody hurt someone I loved.

I'd want someone steadier than me making the decision.

I'd also want to know what that steadier person believed they were doing.

Whether they're protecting somebody, changing somebody, making somebody suffer, or deciding that somebody has had enough existence.

I'd like them to remember that they're somebody, too.

These are enormous things to tuck inside a word as reassuring as justice.

We've become very good at deciding how much of a person's life to take.

I guess I'm just curious what we think we're buying.

Keep reading

The Universe Has Not Asked for Our Review

Who's Performing?

← Back to the journal