M. J. ELLIS

Field note 039

The Man in My Bed Knows Too Much

# The Man in My Bed Knows Too Much

Every morning, a man wakes up in my bed.

He looks exactly like me. He recognizes my wife. He remembers my childhood, my various mistakes, and an embarrassing number of song lyrics that apparently deserve permanent residence in his brain.

He even knows the passwords to most of my accounts.

Naturally, I've assumed he's me.

But lately I've been wondering whether I've been a little too trusting.

Here's the problem.

Every night, I go to sleep. Sometimes I dream. Sometimes I don't remember dreaming at all. Hours disappear, and then suddenly I'm looking at the ceiling again, apparently expected to resume being a person.

Nobody explains the transition.

There's no orientation.

I'm simply handed yesterday's memories and expected to pick up where the previous fellow left off.

And I do.

Every single time.

But how do I know I'm the same one?

I know. Terrible question to ask before coffee.

We generally imagine the self as something continuous. That there's a single observer traveling through life, collecting experiences, remembering things, and occasionally wondering why he walked into the kitchen.

But what happens to that observer during dreamless sleep?

The body is still there, obviously. The brain remains active. A tremendous amount of complicated biological business continues without any need for our participation.

But the experience of being me?

I can't account for every moment.

Maybe consciousness continues in ways I simply don't remember. Maybe it changes. Maybe some aspects of it disappear and return.

I don't know.

And not remembering an experience isn't proof that no experience occurred.

Still, there's something peculiar about how confidently I claim ownership of yesterday.

I remember being there.

Therefore, I assume I was.

Which raises an uncomfortable possibility.

What if I don't remember yesterday because I'm the same person? What if I feel like the same person because I remember yesterday?

Those aren't quite the same thing.

Imagine someone could create an exact copy of you while you slept. Every memory. Every preference. Every irrational dislike of a perfectly harmless vegetable.

The copy wakes up convinced it's you.

It remembers going to bed.

It remembers your first kiss, your worst mistake, and the time you said something so stupid that your brain still brings it up at three in the morning.

From its perspective, nothing unusual happened.

It went to sleep.

It woke up.

Everything is fine.

Except now there are two of you.

And suddenly the memories don't seem quite as conclusive as they did a minute ago.

Of course, this isn't what ordinarily happens when we sleep. Our bodies and brains maintain an extraordinary amount of physical continuity. There is no evidence that an entirely new person appears every morning.

But the thought experiment exposes something interesting.

A convincing sense of continuity isn't necessarily the same thing as proof of an uninterrupted experience.

We've been treating the feeling of being the same person as evidence that we are.

And perhaps it is.

But evidence of what, exactly?

The philosopher David Hume once suggested that when he examined his own experience, he could find perceptions, sensations, thoughts, and feelings, but never some separate, permanent self standing behind them.

There was always something happening.

He just couldn't find the additional thing it was supposedly happening to.

Which seems like a fairly significant oversight, considering the subject.

But maybe the problem is the question.

We keep looking for the self as though it's an object.

Some little captain sitting behind our eyes, steering the body, maintaining the records, and occasionally making executive decisions that the rest of the organization will regret.

I've met my executive management.

I have concerns.

What if the self isn't an object at all?

What if it's a process?

Something that continually takes shape through memory, perception, sensation, relationships, and the ongoing activity of a living organism.

Not a passenger moving through experience.

The experience itself, organized in a way that produces the impression of a passenger.

A whirlpool doesn't have to contain the same water from one moment to the next to remain recognizably the same whirlpool.

Its identity is in the pattern.

Perhaps something similar is happening with us.

That wouldn't make our lives meaningless or our relationships imaginary.

Quite the opposite.

If the self is a process rather than a permanent object, then everything that contributes to that process matters.

The people we love.

The experiences we remember.

The things we learn.

Even the mistakes we spend years trying to understand.

They're not merely things that happened to us.

In some meaningful sense, they're part of what we are.

And this brings me to something I find unexpectedly comforting.

Maybe being the same person doesn't require an unbroken line of conscious observation.

Maybe continuity can exist in the relationships between experiences, even when the experiences themselves are interrupted.

A song is still a song when there's silence between the notes.

A story doesn't stop being a story when you close the book.

And perhaps a life doesn't require somebody to be watching every second for it to remain a life.

I don't know whether that's the answer.

I'm not even certain there's a single answer to be found.

But I do know that tomorrow morning, assuming everything goes according to plan, someone will wake up in my bed.

He'll recognize my wife.

He'll remember writing this.

He'll probably have some complaints about the way it was phrased.

And he'll have absolutely no difficulty believing he's me.

I suppose I'll have to take his word for it.

Especially since he's also inherited all my bills.

Keep reading

The Trouble With Naming Things

What If We're Not as Separate as We Think?

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